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The modern project of creating human-like artificial intelligence (AI) started after World War
II, when it was discovered that electronic computers are not just number-crunching
machines, but can also manipulate symbols. It is possible to pursue this goal without
assuming that machine intelligence is identical to human intelligence. This is known as weak
AI. However, many AI researcher have pursued the aim of developing artificial intelligence
that is in principle identical to human intelligence, called strong AI. Weak AI is less ambitious
than strong AI, and therefore less controversial. However, there are important controversies
related to weak AI as well. This paper focuses on the distinction between artificial general
intelligence (AGI) and artificial narrow intelligence (ANI). Although AGI may be classified as
weak AI, it is close to strong AI because one chief characteristics of human intelligence is its
generality. Although AGI is less ambitious than strong AI, there were critics almost from the
very beginning. One of the leading critics was the philosopher Hubert Dreyfus, who argued
that computers, who have no body, no childhood and no cultural practice, could not acquire
intelligence at all. One of Dreyfus’ main arguments was that human knowledge is partly tacit,
and therefore cannot be articulated and incorporated in a computer program. However, today
one might argue that new approaches to artificial intelligence research have made his
arguments obsolete. Deep learning and Big Data are among the latest approaches, and
advocates argue that they will be able to realize AGI. A closer look reveals that although
development of artificial intelligence for specific purposes (ANI) has been impressive, we
have not come much closer to developing artificial general intelligence (AGI). The article
further argues that this is in principle impossible, and it revives Hubert Dreyfus’ argument
that computers are not in the world.
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The idea of machines that can perform tasks that requireintelligence goes at least back to Descartes and Leibniz.However, the project made a major step forward when in
the early 1950s it was recognized that electronic computers are
not only number-crunching devices, but may be made to
manipulate symbols. This was the birth of artificial intelligence
(AI) research. It is possible to pursue this goal without assuming
that machine intelligence is identical to human intelligence. For
example, one of the pioneers in the field, Marvin Minsky, defined
AI as: “… the science of making machines do things that would
require intelligence if done by men” (quoted from Bolter, 1986,
p. 193). This is sometimes called weak AI. However, many AI
researcher have pursued the aim of developing AI that is in
principle identical to human intelligence, called strong AI. This
entails that “…the appropriately programmed computer is a
mind, in the sense that computers can be literally said to
understand and have other cognitive states” (Searle, 1980, p. 417).
In this paper, I shall use a different terminology, which is better
adapted to the issues that I discuss. Because human intelligence is
general, human-like AI is therefore often called artificial general
intelligence (AGI). Although AGI possesses an essential property
of human intelligence, it may still be regarded as weak AI. It is
nevertheless different from traditional weak AI, which is restric-
ted to specific tasks or areas. Traditional weak AI is therefore
sometimes called artificial narrow intelligence (ANI) (Shane,
2019, p. 41). Although I will sometimes refer to strong AI, the
basic distinction in this article is between AGI and ANI. It is
important to keep the two apart. Advances in ANI are not
advances in AGI.
In 1976 Joseph Weizenbaum, at that time professor of infor-
matics at MIT and the creator of the famous program Eliza,
published the book Computer Power and Human Reason (Wei-
zenbaum, 1976). As the title indicates, he made a distinction
between computer power and human reason. Computer power is,
in today’s terminology, the ability to use algorithms at a tre-
mendous speed, which is ANI. Computer power will never
develop into human reason, because the two are fundamentlly
different. “Human reason” would comprise Aristotle’s prudence
and wisdom. Prudence is the ability to make right decisions in
concrete situations, and wisdom is the ability to see the whole.
These abilities are not algorithmic, and therefore, computer
power cannot—and should not—replace human reason. The
mathematician Roger Penrose a few years later wrote two major
books where he showed that human thinking is basically not
algorithmic (Penrose, 1989, 1994).
However, my arguments will be slightly different from Wei-
zenbaum’s and Penrose’s. I shall pursue a line of arguments that
was originally presented by the philosopher Hubert Dreyfus. He
got into AI research more or less by accident. He had done work
related to the two philosophers Martin Heidegger and Ludwig
Wittgenstein. These philosophers represented a break with
mainstream Western philosophy, as they emphasized the
importance of the human body and practical activity as primary
compared to the world of science. For example, Heidegger argued
that we can only have a concept of a hammer or a chair because
we belong to a culture where we grow up and are able to handle
these objects. Dreyfus therefore thought that computers, who
have no body, no childhood and no cultural practice, could not
acquire intelligence at all (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986, p. 5).
One of the important places for AI research in the 1950s and
1960s was Rand Corporation. Strangely enough, they engaged
Dreyfus as a consultant in 1964. The next year he submitted a
critical report titled: “Alchemy and Artificial Intelligence”.
However, the leaders of the AI project at Rand argued that the
report was nonsense, and should not be published. When it was
finally released, it became the most demanded report in the his-
tory of Rand Corporation. Dreyfus later expanded the report to
the book What Computers Can’t Do (Dreyfus, 1972). In the book
he argued that an important part of human knowledge is tacit.
Therefore, it cannot be articulated and implemented in a com-
puter program.
Although Dreyfus was fiercely attacked by some AI researchers,
he no doubt pointed to a serious problem. But during the 1980s
another paradigm became dominant in AI research. It was based
on the idea of neural networks. Instead of taking manipulation of
symbols as model, it took the processes in our nervous system
and brain as model. A neural network can learn without receiving
explicit instructions. Thus it looked as if Dreyfus’ arguments for
what computers cannot do were obsolete.
The latest off-spring is Big Data. Big Data is the application
of mathematical methods to huge amounts of data to find
correlations and infer probabilities (Najafabadi et al., 2015). Big
Data poses an interesting challenge: I mentioned previously
that AGI is not part of strong AI. However, although Big Data
does not represent the ambition of developing strong AI,
advocates argued that this is not necessary. We do not have to
develop computers with human-like intelligence. On the con-
trary, we may change our thinking to be like the computers.
Implicitly this is the message of Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and
Kenneth Cukier’s book: Big Data: A Revolution That Will
Transform How We Live, Work, and Think (Mayer-Schönber-
ger and Cukier, 2014). The book is optimistic about what Big
Data can accomplish and its positive effects on our personal
lives and society as a whole.
Some even argue that the traditional scientific method of using
hypotheses, causal models, and tests is obsolete. Causality is an
important part of human thinking, particularly in science, but
according to this view we do not need causality. Correlations are
enough. For example, based on criminal data we can infer where
crimes will occur, and use it to allocate police resources. We may
even be able to predict crimes before they are committed, and
thus prevent them.
If we look at some of the literature on AI research it looks as if
there are no limits to what the research can accomplish within a
few decades. One example is Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier’s
book that I referred to above. Here is one quotation:
In the future—and sooner than we may think – many
aspects of our world will be augmented or replaced by
computer systems that today are the sole purview of human
judgment (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2014, p. 12).
An example that supports this view is the Obama Adminis-
tration, which in 2012 announced a “Big Data Research and
Development Initiative” to “help solve some of the Nations’s most
pressing challenges” (quoted from Chen and Lin, 2014, p. 521).
However, when one looks at what has actually been accom-
plished compared to what is promised, the discrepancy is striking.
I shall later give some examples. One explanation for this dis-
crepancy may be that profit is the main driving force, and,
therefore, many of the promises should be regarded as marketing.
However, although commercial interests no doubt play a part, I
think that this explanation is insufficient. I will add two factors:
First, one of the few dissidents in Silicon Valley, Jerone Lanier,
has argued that the belief in scientific immortality, the develop-
ment of computers with super-intelligence, etc., are expressions of
a new religion, “expressed through an engineering culture”
(Lanier, 2013, p. 186). Second, when it is argued that computers
are able to duplicate a human activity, it often turns out that the
claim presuppose an account of that activity that is seriously
simplified and distorted. To put it simply: The overestimation of
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technology is closely connected with the underestimation of
humans.
I shall start with Dreyfus’ main argument that AGI cannot be
realized. Then I shall give a short account of the development of
AI research after his book was published. Some spectacular
breakthroughs have been used to support the claim that AGI is
realizable within the next few decades, but I will show that very
little has been achieved in the realization of AGI. I will then argue
that it is not just a question of time, that what has not been
realized sooner, will be realized later. On the contrary, I argue
that the goal cannot in principle be realized, and that the project
is a dead end. In the second part of the paper I restrict myself to
arguing that causal knowledge is an important part of humanlike
intelligence, and that computers cannot handle causality because
they cannot intervene in the world. More generally, AGI cannot
be realized because computers are not in the world. As long as
computers do not grow up, belong to a culture, and act in the
world, they will never acquire human-like intelligence.
Finally, I will argue that the belief that AGI can be realized is
harmful. If the power of technology is overestimated and human
skills are underestimated, the result will in many cases be that we
replace something that works well with something that is inferior.
Tacit knowledge
Dreyfus placed AI into a philosophical tradition going back to
Plato. Plato’s theory of knowledge was constructed on the ideal of
mathematics, in particular geometry. Geometry is not about
material bodies, but ideal bodies. We can only acquire real
knowledge, episteme, by turning the attention away from the
material world, and direct it “upwards”, to the world of ideal
objects. Plato even criticized the geometers for not understanding
their own trade, because they thought they were “… doing
something and their reasoning had a practical end, and the
subject were not, in fact, pursued for the sake of knowledge”
(Plato, 1955, p. 517). Skills are merely opinion, doxa, and are
relegated to the bottom of his knowledge hierarchy.
According to this view, a minimum requirement for something
to be regarded as knowledge is that it can be formulated explicitly.
Western philosophy has by and large followed Plato and only
accepted propositional knowledge as real knowledge. An excep-
tion is what Dreyfus called the “anti-philosophers” Merleau-
Ponty, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. He also referred to the sci-
entist and philosopher Michael Polanyi. In his book, Personal
Knowledge Polanyi introduced the expression tacit knowledge1.
Most of the knowledge we apply in everyday life is tacit. In fact,
we do not know which rules we apply when we perform a task.
Polanyi used swimming and bicycle riding as examples. Very few
swimmers know that what keeps them afloat is how they regulate
their respiration: When they breathe out, they do not empty their
lungs, and when they breathe in, they inflate their lungs more
than normal.
Something similar applies to bicycle riding. The bicycle rider
keeps his balance by turning the handlebar of the bicycle. To
avoid falling to the left, he moves the handlebar to the left, and to
avoid falling to the right he turns the handlebar to the right. Thus
he keeps his balance by moving along a series of small curvatures.
According to Polanyi a simple analysis shows that for a given
angle of unbalance, the curvature of each winding is inversely
proportional to the square of the speed of the bicycle. But the
bicycle rider does not know this, and it would not help him
become a better bicycle rider (Polanyi, 1958, p. 50). Later Polanyi
formulated this insight as “…we can know more than we can tell”
(Polanyi, 2009, p. 4, italics in original).
However, the important thing in Polanyi’s contribution is that
he argued that skills are a precondition for articulate knowledge
in general, and scientific knowledge in particular. For example, to
carry out physical experiments requires a high degree of skills.
These skills cannot just be learned from textbooks. They are
acquired by instruction from someone who knows the trade.
Similarly, Hubert Dreyfus, in cooperation with his brother
Stuart, developed a model for acquisition of skills. At the lowest
level the performer follows explicit rules. The highest level, expert
performance, is similar to Polanyi’s account of scientific practice.
An important part of expertise is tacit. The problem facing the
development of expert systems, that is, systems that enable a
computer to simulate expert performance (for example medical
diagnostics) is that an important part of the expert knowledge is
tacit. If experts try to articulate the knowledge they apply in their
performance, they normally regress to a lower level. Therefore,
according to Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus, expert systems are not
able to capture the skills of an expert performer (Dreyfus and
Dreyfus, 1986, p. 36). We know this phenomenon from everyday
life. Most of us are experts on walking. However, if we try to
articulate how we walk, we certainly give a description that does
not capture the skills involved in walking.
Three “milestones” in AI research
However, after Hubert Dreyfus published What Computers Can’t
Do, AI has made tremendous progress. I will mention three
“milestones” that have received public attention and contributed
to the impression that AGI is just “around the corner”.
The first “milestone” is IBM’s chess-playing computer Deep
Blue, which is often regarded as a breakthrough when it in 1997
defeated the world champion of chess, Garri Kasparov. However,
Deep Blue was an example of ANI; it was made for a specific
purpose. Although it did extremely well in an activity that
requires intelligence when performed by humans, no one would
claim that Deep Blue had acquired general intelligence.
The second is IBM’s computer Watson. It was developed with
the explicit goal of joining the quiz show Jeopardy!. This is a
competition where the participants are given the answers, and are
then supposed to find the right questions. They may for example
be presented the answer: “This ‘Father of Our Country’ didn’t
really chop down a cherry tree”. The correct question the parti-
cipants are supposed to find is: ”Who was George Washington?”2
Jeopardy! requires a much larger repertoir of knowledge and
skills than chess. The tasks cover a variety of areas, such as sci-
ence, history, culture, geography, and sports, and may contain
analogies and puns. It has three participants, competing to answer
first. If you answer incorrectly, you will be drawn and another of
the participants will have the opportunity to answer. Therefore,
the competition requires both knowledge, speed, but also the
ability to limit oneself. The program has enjoyed tremendous
popularity in the United States since it began in 1964, and is
viewed by an average of seven million people (Brynjolfson and
McAfee, 2014, p. 24).
Watson communicates using natural language. When it par-
ticipated in Jeopardy! it was not connected to the Internet, but
had access to 200 million pages of information (Susskind and
Susskind, 2015, p. 165; Ford, 2015, p. 98ff). In 2011 it beat the two
best participants in Jeopardy!, Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter.
Jennings had won 74 times in a row in 2004, and had received
over $3 million in total. Rutter had won over Jennings in 2005,
and he too had won over $3 million. In the 2-day competition,
Watson won more than three times as much as each of its human
competitors.
Although Watson was constructed to participate in Jeopardy!,
IBM had further plans. Shortly after Watson had won Jeopardy!
the company announced that they would apply the power of
the computer to medicine: It should become an AI medical
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super-doctor, and revolutionize medicine. The basic idea was that
if Watson had access to all medical literature (patients’ health
records, textbooks, journal articles, lists of drugs, etc.) it should be
able to offer a better diagnosis and treatment than any human
doctor. In the following years IBM engaged in several projects,
but the success has been rather limited. Some have just been
closed down, and some have failed spectacularly. It has been
much more difficult than originally assumed to construct an AI
doctor. Instead of super-doctors IBM’s Watson Health has turned
out AI assistants that can perform in routine tasks (Strickland,
2019).
The third “milestone” is Alphabet’s AlphaGo. Go is a board
game invented more than 2000 years ago in China. The com-
plexity of the game is regarded as even larger than chess, and it is
played by millions of people, in particular in East Asia. In 2016,
AlphaGo defeated the world champion Le Sedol in five highly
publicized matches in Seoul, South Korea. The event was docu-
mented in the award-winning film AlphaGo (2017, directed by
Greg Kohs).
AlphaGo is regarded as a milestone in AI research because it
was an example of the application of a strategy called deep
reinforcement learning. This is reflected in the name of the
company, which is DeepMind. (After a reconstruction of Google,
Google and DeepMind are subsidiaries of Alphabet.) It is an
example of an approach to AI research that is based on the
paradigm of artificial neural networks. An artificial neural net-
work is modeled on neural networks. Our brain contains
approximately one hundred billion neurons. Each neuron is
connected to approximately 1000 neurons via synapses. This
gives around a hundred trillion connections in the brain. An
artificial neural network consists of artificial neurons, which are
much simpler than natural neurons. However, it has been
demonstrated that when many neurons are connected in a net-
work, a large enough network can in theory carry out any com-
putation. What is practically possible, is of course a different
question (Minsky, 1972, p. 55; Tegmark, 2017, p. 74).
Neural networks are particularly good at pattern recognition.
For example, to teach a neural network to identify a cat in a
picture we do not have to program the criteria we use to identify a
cat. Humans have normally no problems distinguishing between,
say, cats and dogs. To some degree we can explain the differences,
but very few, probably no one, will be able to give a complete list
of all criteria used. It is for the most part tacit knowledge, learned
by examples and counter-examples. The same applies to neural
networks.
A deep learning neural network consists of different layers of
artificial neurons. For example, a network may have four different
layers. In analyzing a picture the first layer may identify pixels as
light and dark. The second layer may identify edges and simple
shapes. The third layer may identify more complex shapes and
objects, and the fourth layer may learn which shapes can be used
to identify an object (Jones, 2014, p. 148).
The advantage is that one must not formulate explicitly the
criteria used, for example, to identify a face. This is the crucial
difference between the chess program Deep Blue and AlphaGo.
Although a human chess player uses a mixture of calculation and
intuition to evaluate a particular board position, Deep Blue was
programmed to evaluate numerous possible board positions, and
decide the best possible in a given situation. Go is different. In
many cases expert players relied on intuition only, and were only
able to describe a board position as having “good shape” (Nielsen,
2016). I have mentioned earlier that one of Hubert Dreyfus’ main
arguments against AGI was that human expertise is partly tacit,
and cannot be articulated. AlphaGo showed that computers can
handle tacit knowledge, and it therefore looks as if Dreyfus’
argument is obsolete. However, I will later show that this “tacit
knowledge” is restricted to the idealized “world of science”, which
is fundamentally different from the human world that Dreyfus
had in mind.
The advantage of not having to formulate explicit rules comes
at a price, though. In a traditional computer program all the
parameters are explicit. This guarantees full transparency. In a
neural network this transparency is lost. One often does not know
what parameters are used. Some years ago a team at University of
Washington developed a system that was trained to distinguish
between huskies and wolves. This is a task that requires con-
siderable skill, because there is not much difference between
them. In spite of this the system had an astonishing 90% accu-
racy. However, the team discovered that the system recognized
wolves because there was snow on most of the wolf pictures. The
team had invented a snow detector! (Dingli, 2018).
AlphaGo was developed by the researchers of DeepMind, and is
regarded as a big success. DeepMind’s approach was also applied
successfully to the Atari games Breakout and Space Invaders, and
the computer game Starcraft. However, it turned out that the
system lacks flexibility, and is not able to adapt to changes in the
environment. It has even turned out to be vulnerable to tiny
changes. Because real world problems take place in a changing
world, deep reinforcement learning has so far found few com-
mercial applications. Research and development is costly, but
DeepMind’s losses of 154 million dollars in 2016, 341 million in
2017, and 572 million in 2018 are hardly a sign of success
(Marcus, 2019).
The latest hype: Big Data
The challenge of neural networks is that they must be able to
handle huge amounts of data. For example AlphaGo was first
trained on 150,000 games played by competent Go players. Then
it was improved by repeatedly playing against earlier versions of
itself.
Computers’ increasing ability to process and store huge
amounts of data has led to what is called the “data explosion”, or
even “data deluge”. Already in 2012 it was estimated that Google
processed around 24 petabytes (24 × 1015) of data every day. This
is thousands of times the amount of printed material in the US
Library of Congress (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2014, p. 8).
At the same time it was estimated that 2.5 exabytes (2.5 × 1018
bytes) were created in the world per day. This is estimated to be
approximately half of all the words ever spoken by humans. This
amount of data is beyond human imagination, and it is the
background for the Big Data approach.
Although Big Data analysis may be regarded as a supplemental
method for data analysis for large amounts of data, typically
terabytes and petabytes, it is sometimes presented as a new
epistemological approach. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Ken-
neth Cukier start their book Big Data with the example of a flu
that was discovered in 2009. It combined elements from viruses
that caused bird flu and swine flu, and was given the name H1N1.
It spread quickly, and within a week public health agencies
around the world feared a pandemic. Some even feared a pan-
demic of the same size as the 1918 Spanish flu that killed millions.
There was no vaccine against the virus, and the only thing the
health authorities could do was to try to slow it down. But to be
able to do that, they had to know where it had already spread.
Although doctors were requested to inform about new cases, this
information would take 1–2 weeks to reach the authorities, pri-
marily because most patients do not consult a doctor immediately
after the appearance of the symptoms of the disease.
However, researchers at Google had just before this outbreak
invented a method that could much better predict the spread of
the flu. Google receives more than three billion search queries
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every day, and save them all. People who have symptoms of flu
tend to search the internet for information on flu. Therefore, by
looking at search items that are highly correlated with flu, the
researchers could map the spread of flu much quicker than the
health authorities (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2014, p. 2).
Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier regard this a a success story.
But this may be an example of what is sometimes called “the
fallacy of initial success”. In 2013 the model reported twice as
many doctor visits for influenza-like illnesses as the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, which is regarded as a reliable
source of information. The initial version of the model had
probably included seasonal data that were correlated with the flu,
but were causally unrelated. Therefore, the model was part a flu
detector and part a winter detector. Although the model has been
updated, its performance has been far below the initial promises
(Lazer et al., 2014; Shane, 2019, p. 171).
Correlations and causes
The previous examples just involved correlations. However, in the
sciences and also in everyday life, we want to have causal rela-
tions. For example, one of the big questions of our time involves
causal knowledge: Is the global warming that we observe caused
by human activity (the release of greenhouse gases into the
atmosphere), or is it just natural variations?
The nature of causal relationships has been discussed for
centuries, in particular after David Hume criticized the old idea of
a necessary relationship between cause and effect. According to
Hume we have to be satisfied with the observation of regularities.
His contemporary Immanuel Kant, on the contrary, argued that
causal relationships are a prerequisite for the acquisition of
knowledge. It is necessary that every effect has a cause.
However, instead of going into the philosophical discussion
about causal relationships, which has continued until this day, it
is more fruitful to see how we identify a causal relationship. The
philosopher John Stuart Mill formulated some rules (he called
them “canons”) that enable us to identify causal relationships. His
“second canon” which he also called “the method of difference” is
the following:
If an instance in which the phenomenon under investiga-
tion occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur,
have every circumstance in common save one, that one
occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which
alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or
an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon
(Mill, 1882, p. 483).
From this quotation we see that the distinguishing mark of a
causal relationship is a 100% correlation between cause and effect.
But most correlations are not causal. For example, there is a high
positive correlation between gasoline prices and my age, but there
is obviously no causal relationship between the two. A correlation
may therefore be an indication of a causal link, but it need not be.
Therefore, in the quotation above, Mill requires that the two
cases be equal in all circumstances. But still we can only decide
that the difference between the two is either the cause or the
effect, because correlation is a symmetrical mathematical rela-
tionship: If A is correlated with B, B is correlated with A. In
contrast, if C is the cause of E, E is not the cause of C. Therefore,
correlations cannot distinguish between cause and effect. To
make this distinction we need something more: The cause pro-
duces, or at least brings about, the effect. Therefore, we may
remove the assumed cause, and see if the effect disappears.
We have a famous example of this procedure from the history
of medicine (more specifically epidemiology). Around 1850 there
was a cholera epidemic in London. John Snow was a practicing
physician. He noted that there was a connection between what
company people got the water from and the frequency of cholera.
The company Southwark and Vauxhall, which had water intake
at a polluted site in the Thames, had a high frequency of cholera
cases. Another company, the Lambeth Company, had sig-
nificantly lower numbers. Although this was before the theory of
bacteria as the cause of disease, he assumed that the cause of the
disease was found in the water. Here are Snow’s numbers:
Company Deaths per 10,000 households
Southwark and Vauxhall 315
Lambeth Company 37
The rest of London 59
After Snow had sealed a water pump that he believed contained
infectious water, the cholera epidemic ended (Sagan, 1996, p. 76).
If the effect always follows the cause, everything else equal, we
have deterministic causality. However, many people smoke
cigarettes without contracting cancer. The problem is that in
practice some uncertainty is involved. Therefore, we need a
definition of a causal relationship when we have <100% correla-
tion between cause and effect. According to this definition a
probabilistic cause is not always followed by the effect, but the
frequency of the effect is higher than when the cause is not
present. This can be written as P(E|C) > P(E|not-C). P(E|C) is a
conditional probability, and can be read as “the probability of E,
given C”.
However, although this looks straightforward, it is not. An
example will show this. After World War II there were many
indications that cigarette smoking might cause lung cancer. It
looks as if this question might be decided in a straightforward
way: One selects two groups of people that are similar in all
relevant aspects. One group starts smoking cigarettes and another
does not. This is a simple randomized, clinical trial. Then one
checks, after 10 years, 20 years, 30 years, and so on, and see if
there is a difference in the frequency of lung cancer in the two
groups.
Of course, if cigarette smoking is as dangerous as alleged, one
would not wait decades to find out. Therefore, one had to use the
population at hand, and use correlations: One took a sample of
people with lung cancer and another sample of the population
that did not have cancer and looked at different background
factors: Is there a higher frequency of cigarette smokers among
the people who have contracted lung cancer than people who
have not contracted lung cancer. The main criterium is “ceteris
paribus”, everything else equal.
One thing is to acknowledge that we sometimes have to use
correlations to find causal relations. It is quite another thing to
argue that we do not need causes at all. Nevertheless, some argue
that we can do without causal relationship. In 2008 the chief
editor of Wired Magazine, Chris Anderson, wrote an article with
the title: ”The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Sci-
entific Method Obsolete”. In the article he argued that correla-
tions are sufficient. We can use huge amount of data and let
statistical algorithms find patterns that science cannot. He went
even further, and argued that the traditional scientific method, of
using hypotheses, causal models and tests, is becoming obsolete
(Anderson, 2008).
According to Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, Anderson’s
article unleashed a furious debate, “… even though Anderson
quickly backpedaled away from his bolder claims” (Mayer-
Schönberger and Cukier, 2014, p. 71). But even if Anderson
modified his original claims, Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0494-4 ARTICLE
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS |            (2020) 7:10 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0494-4 5
agree that in most cases we can do without knowing causal
relations: “Big Data is about what, not why. We don’t always need
to know the cause of a phenomenon; rather, we can let data speak
for itself” (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2014, p. 14). Later
they formulate it in this way: “Causality won’t be discarded, but it
is being knocked off its pedestal as the primary fountain of
meaning. Big data turbocharges non-causal analyses, often
replacing causal investigations” (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier,
2014, p. 68). Pearl and Mackenzie put it this way: “The hope—
and at present, it is usually a silent one—is that the data them-
selves will guide us to the right answers whenever causal ques-
tions come up” (Pearl and Mackenzie, 2018, p. 16). I have to add
that Pearl and Mackenzie are critical of this view.
The mini Turing test
Anderson was not the first to argue that science can do without
causes. At the end of the 19th century one of the pioneers of
modern statistics, Karl Pearson, argued that causes have no place
in science (Pearl and Mackenzie, 2018, p. 67) and at the beginning
of the 20th century one of the most influential philosophers of
that century, Bertrand Russell, wrote the article “On the Notion of
Cause” where he called “the law of causality” a “relic of a bygone
age” (Russell, 1963, p. 132). For example, when bodies move
under the mutual attraction of gravity, nothing can be called a
cause, and nothing an effect according to Russell. There is
“merely a formula” (Russell, 1963, p. 141). He might have added
that Newton’s mechanics had been reformulated by Joseph-Louis
Lagrange and William Hamilton to an abstract theory without the
concept of force.
However, Russell looked for causality at the wrong place. He
took simply Newton’s theory for granted, and had forgotten that
Newton himself subscribed to what in his time was called
“experimental philosophy”. Physics is no doubt an experimental
science, and to carry out experiments the physicist must be able
to move around, to handle instruments, to read scales, and to
communicate with other physicists. As the physicist Roger
Newton has pointed out, a physicist “…effectively conducts
experiments by jiggling one part of Nature and watching how
other parts respond” (Newton 1997, p. 142). To find out if A
causes B, it is important for “A to be under our control” (Newton,
1997, p. 144, italics in original).
I have already quoted Pearl’s and Mackenzie’s book The Book
of Why (2018). The main argument in the book is that to create
humanlike intelligence in a computer, the computer must be able
to master causality. They ask the question:
How can machines (and people) represent causal knowl-
edge in a way that would enable them to access the
necessary information swiftly, answer questions correctly,
and do it with ease, as a three-year-old child can? (Pearl
and Mackenzie, 2018, p. 37).
They call this the “mini-Turing test”. It has the prefix “mini”
because it is not a full Turing test, but is confined to causal
relations.
Before I go into the mini-Turing test I will briefly recall the
Turing test. In the article “Computing Machinery and Intelli-
gence” (Turing, 1950). Alan Turing asked the question: How can
we determine if computers have acquired general intelligence? He
starts by saying that the question he tries to answer is: “Can
machines think?”, but instead of going into the question of what
intelligence is, he sets up a kind of game. In the game a questioner
can communicate with a computer and a human being. He has to
communicate through a key-board, so he does not know who is
the computer and who is the human. The point is that the
machine pretends to be human, and it is the job of the questioner
to decide which of the two is the computer and who is the human.
If the questioner is unable to distinguish, we can say that the
computer is intelligent. Turing called this the “imitation game”,
but it is later known as the “Turing test”. If the computer passes
the test, it has, according to Turing, acquired general intelligence.
According to Pearl and Mackenzie a minimum requirement to
pass the Turing test is that the computer is able to handle causal
questions. From an evolutionary perspective this makes sense.
Why Homo sapiens has been so successful in the history of
evolution is of course a complex question. Many factors have
been involved, and the ability to cooperate is probably one of the
most important. However, a decisive step took place between
70,000 and 30,000 years ago, what the historian Yuval Harari calls
the Cognitive Revolution (Harari, 2014, p. 23). According to
Harari the distinguishing mark of the Cognitive Revolution is the
ability to imagine something that does not exist. Harari’s example
is the ivory figurine “the lion man” (or “the lioness woman”) that
was found in the Stadel Cave in Germany, and is approximately
32,000 years old. It consists of a human body and the head of
a lion.
Pearl and Mackenzie refer to Harari, and add that the creation
of the lion man is the precursor of philosophy, scientific dis-
covery, and technological innovation. The fundamental pre-
condition for this creation is the ability to ask and answer
questions of the form: “What happens if I do ……?” (Pearl and
Mackenzie, 2018, p. 2).
The mini-Turing test is restricted to causal relationships. If
computers can handle causal knowledge, they will pass this test.
However, the problem is that in this regard computers have not
made any progress for decades: “Just as they did 30 years ago,
machine-learning programs (including those with deep neural
networks) operate almost entirely in an associative mode…”
(Pearl and Mackenzie, 2018, p. 30). But this is insufficient. To
answer causal questions we must be able to intervene in
the world.
According to Pearl and Mackenzie the root of the problem is
that computers do not have a model of reality. However, the
problem is that nobody can have a model of reality. Any model
can only depict simplified aspects of reality. The real problem is
that computers are not in the world, because they are not
embodied.
The real Turing test
Pearl and Mackenzie are right in arguing that computers cannot
pass the mini-Turing test because they cannot answer causal
question. And I shall argue that they cannot pass the full Turing
test because they are not in the world, and, therefore, they have
no understanding. A few examples from the Turing test will
show this.
There is an annual competition where the award (Loebner
Prize) is given to the AI program most similar to a human being.
The competition is the Turing test, but gold or silver medals have
never been awarded. The program Mitsuku won in 2013, 2016,
2017, 2018, and 2019.
The philosopher Luciano Floridi recounts how he joined the
judging panel when the competition was first held in England in
2008. One of the judges started with the question: “If we take each
other’s hand, whose hand am I holding then?” The computer
replied by talking about something completely different: “We live
in eternity. So, yeah, no. We don’t believe.” Another question was:
“The four capital cities of England are three, Manchester and
Liverpool. What’s wrong with this sentence?” The computer had
no meaningful answer (Floridi, 2014, p. 133).
The conversation that Floridi refers to, took place more than 10
years ago. I was curious to see if the program had improved.
ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0494-4
6 HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS |            (2020) 7:10 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0494-4
I have tried it out several times, and it has not improved much.
Below is an example. When Mitsuku in 2008 was asked: “If we
take each other’s hand, whose hand am I holding then?” the
computer failed. This time it came out with the right answer.
However, it did not take long before it failed. In the printout
below “Millie” can either be the Mitsuku computer, or a human.
At the end of the conversation one is supposed to guess if one
talked to a computer or to a human being. It was not difficult to
determine that I had talked to a computer.
Here is the “conversation”:
Mitsuku chatbot Welcome Ragnar, now talking. * Topic is
’Turing Test’ * Set by admin (1 day ago)
<Ragnar> If I shake your hand, whose hand am I holding?
<Millie> I will be holding yours adn you will be holding
mine. What’s with the dumb questions?
<Ragnar> Why is the question dumb?
<Millie> I want to know everything about you.
<Ragnar> But you did not explain why you regarded the
question as dumb.
<Millie> Sorry, I must have forgot. What was your
question again?
<Ragnar> If we shake hands, whose hand am I holding?
<Millie> We would be holding each other’s hand.
<Ragnar> And why is that a dumb question?
<Millie> Why do I exist? (MitsukuHomepage. I have kept
Mitsuku’s misprinting)
Computers fail because they are not in the world. Mitsuku
characterized the first question as dumb, but could not explain
why. Any child would be able to do that.
However, the competition rules of the Loebner Prize have been
changed. The aim of getting computers to pass the Turing test has
been given up, because “… chatbots are typically so quickly
unmasked that the prize was always one for ’best of’”
(LoebnerPrize).
Conclusion: computers are not in the world
The main thesis of this paper is that we will not be able to realize
AGI because computers are not in the world. However, it is
crucial that we clarify what is meant by “world”.
As the historian of science Alexandre Koyré has pointed out,
the most important achievement of the scientific revolution of
the 17th century was the replacement of Aristotelian science by
an abstract scientific ideal (“paradigm”) (Koyré 1978, pp. 38–39).
Koyré argued convincingly that Galileo was basically a Platonist
(Koyré, 1968). As in the case of Plato, the key was mathematics.
According to Galileo the book of nature is written in the lan-
guage of mathematics (Galilei, 1970, p. 237). Therefore, Galileo’s
world is an abstract and idealized world, close to Plato’s world
of ideas.
The system that comes closest to this ideal world is our solar
system, what Isaac Newton called “the system of the world”.
Newton’s mechanics became the model for all science. The best
expression of this ideal was given by the French mathematician
Pierre Simon de Laplace. He argued that there is in principle no
difference between a planet and a molecule. If we had complete
knowledge of the state of the universe at one time, we could in
principle determine the state at any previous and successive time
(Laplace, 1951, p. 6). This means that the universe as a whole can
be described by an algorithm. Turing referred to this passage
from Laplace in his article “Computing Machinery and Intelli-
gence”, and added that the predictions he (Turing) was con-
sidering, were nearer to practicability than the predictions
considered by Laplace, which comprised the universe as a whole
(Turing, 1950, p. 440).
As Russell pointed out, in this world we cannot even speak
about causes, only mathematical functions. Because most
empirical sciences are causal, they are far from this ideal world.
The sciences that come closest, are classical mechanics and the-
oretical physics.
Although this ideal world is a metaphysical idea that has not
been realized anywhere, it has had a tremendous historical
impact. Most philosophers and scientists after Galileo and Des-
cartes have taken it to be the real world, which implies that
everything that happens, “at the bottom” is governed by mathe-
matical laws, algorithms. This applies to the organic world as well.
According to Descartes all organisms, including the human body,
are automata. Today we would call them robots or computers.
Descartes made an exception for the human soul, which is not a
part of the material world, and therefore is not governed by laws
of nature. The immaterial soul accounts for man’s free will.
However, most advocates of AGI (and advocates of strong AI)
will today exclude Descartes’ immaterial soul, and follow the
arguments of Yuval Harari. In his latest book 21 Lessons for the
21st Century he refers to neuroscience and behavioral economics,
which have allegedly shown that our decisions are not the result
of “some mysterious free will”, but the result of “millions of
neurons calculating probabilities within a split second” (Harari,
2018, p. 20). Therefore, AI can do many things better than
humans. He gives as examples driving a vehicle in a street full of
pedestrians, lending money to strangers, and negotiating business
deals. These jobs require the ability “to correctly assess the
emotions and desires of other people.” The justification is this:
Yet if these emotions and desires are in fact no more than
biochemical algorithms, there is no reason why computers
cannot decipher these algorithms—and do so far better
than any Homo sapiens (Harari, 2018, p. 21).
This quotation echoes the words used by Francis Crick. In The
Astonishing Hypothesis he explains the title of the book in the
following way:
The Astonishing Hypothesis is that “You”, your joys and
your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your
sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more
than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their
associated molecules (Crick, 1994, p. 3).
However, there is a problem with both these quotations. If
Harari and Crick are right, then the quotations are “nothing but”
the result of chemical algorithms and “no more than” the beha-
vior of a vast assembly of nerve cells. How can they then be true?
If we disregard the problem of self-reference, and take the ideal
world of science that I have described above to be the (only) real
world, then Harari’s argument makes sense. But the replacement
of our everyday world by the world of science is based on a
fundamental misunderstanding. Edmund Husserl was one of the
first who pointed this out, and attributed this misunderstanding
to Galileo. According to Husserl, Galileo was “…at once a dis-
coverer and a concealing genius” (Husserl, 1970, p. 52). Husserl
called this misunderstanding “objectivism”. Today a more com-
mon name is “scientism”.
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Contrary to this, Husserl insisted that the sciences are funda-
mentally a human endeavor. Even the most abstract theories are
grounded in our everyday world, Husserl’s “lifeworld”. Husserl
mentions Einstein’s theory of relativity, and argues that it is
dependent on “Michelson’s experiments3 and the corroborations
of them by other researchers” (Husserl, 1970, p. 125). To carry
out this kind of experiments, the scientists must be able to move
around, to handle instruments, to read scales and to commu-
nicate with other scientists.
There is a much more credible account of how we are able to
understand other people than the one given by Harari. As Hubert
Dreyfus pointed out, we are bodily and social beings, living in a
material and social world. To understand another person is not to
look into the chemistry of that person’s brain, not even into that
person’s “soul”, but is rather to be in that person’s “shoes”. It is to
understand the person’s lifeworld.
The American author Theodore Roszak has constructed a
thought example to illustrate this point: Let us imagine that we
are watching a psychiatrist at work. He is a hard working and
skilled psychiatrist and obviously has a very good practice. The
waiting room is full of patients with a variety of emotional and
mental disorders. Some are almost hysterical, some have strong
suicidal thoughts, some hallucinations, some have the cruelest
nightmares and some are driven to madness by the thought that
they are being watched by people who will hurt them. The psy-
chiatrist listens attentively to each patient and does his best to
help them, but without much success. On the contrary, they all
seem to be getting worse, despite the psychiatrist’s heroic efforts.
Now Roszak asks us to put this into a larger context. The
psychiatrist’s office is in a building, and the building is in a place.
This place is Buchenwald and the patients are prisoners in the
concentration camp (Roszak, 1992, p. 221). Biochemical algo-
rithms would not help us to understand the patients. What does
help, in fact, what is imperative, is to know the larger context. The
example simply does not make sense if we do not know that the
psychiatrist’s office is in a concentration camp.
Only few of us are able to put ourselves in the shoes of a
prisoner of a concentration camp. Therefore, we cannot fully
understand people in situations that are very different from what
we have ourselves experienced. But to some degree we can
understand, and we can understand because we are also in
the world.
Computers are not in our world. I have earlier said that neural
networks need not be programmed, and therefore can handle
tacit knowledge. However, it is simply not true, as some of the
advocates of Big Data argue, that the data “speak for themselves”.
Normally, the data used are related to one or more models, they
are selected by humans, and in the end they consist of numbers.
If we think, for example like Harari, that the world is “at the
bottom” governed by algorithms, then we will have a tendency to
overestimate the power of AI and underestimate human accom-
plishments. The expression “nothing but” that appears in the
quotation from Harari may lead to a serious oversimplification in
the description of human and social phenomena. I think this is at
least a part of the explanation of the failure of both IBM Watson
Health and Alphabet’s DeepMind. “IBM has encountered a
fundamental mismatch between the way machines learn and the
way doctors work” (Strickland, 2019) and DeepMind has dis-
covered that “what works for Go may not work for the challen-
ging problems that DeepMind aspires to solve with AI, like cancer
and clean energy” (Marcus, 2019).
The overestimation of the power of AI may also have detri-
mental effects on science. In their frequently quoted book The
Second Machine Age Erik Brynjolfson and Andrew McAfee argue
that digitization can help us to understand the past. They refer to
a project that analyzed more than five million books published in
English since 1800. Some of the results from the project was that
“the number of words in English has increased by more than 70%
between 1950 and 2000, that fame now comes to people more
quickly than in the past but also fades faster, and that in the 20th
century interest in evolution was declining until Watson and
Crick discovered the structure of DNA.” This allegedly leads to
“better understanding and prediction—in other words, of better
science—via digitization” (Brynjolfson and McAfee, 2014, p. 69).
In my opinion it is rather an illustration of Karl Popper’s insight:
“Too many dollars may chase too few ideas” (Popper, 1981,
p. 96).
My conclusion is very simple: Hubert Dreyfus’ arguments
against general AI are still valid.
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Notes
1 Polanyi normally uses “knowing” instead of “knowledge” to emphasize the personal
dimension. However, I will use the more traditional “knowledge”.
2 The example is taken from the Wikipedia article on Jeopardy! (Wikipedia: Jeopardy).
3 I have given a detailed description of Michelson’s instruments in Fjelland (1991).
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